USSR's ghost units alive and well in cyberspace

The Database's bot has found data that can be formatted into this report.
The following military units have used their Sun or Linux machines to attempt and establish unauthorized access to US DOD, Defense contractor, and NATO servers:

40236 Leninsk, Baykonur, (Кзыл-Ординская обл. г.Ленинск, Байконур)
96742 Chita (Чита)

Rostov-on-Don Defense Institute of the Missile Forces (Ростовский Военный институт Ракетных войск / Ростов-на-Дону)

Ghost units still fiuntioning in cyberspace? Excellent deception, diversion, and maskirovka tactic.
two units: в/ч пп 36546 ОБС, and 15332 formerly located in Poland at Borne-Sulinovo (incredible: "Bourne"identity?) Борне-Сулиново

and I'm back by silent demand

I am back after a long hiatus which was rather fruitful. Many documents gathered, images obtained, lists formatted for blogging, and much more.

The Gazprom list is here, as the first installment. That post has been empty for quite some time, because back then I thought I had the list, but it arrived in a poor-quality hard-copy.

This time I have in my possession some more of Putin's communications, transcripts of Russia's naval operations, mysterious codeword texts, radio intercepts, documents that the Bear has pilfered, all ready for the prime time.

Any requests?

Interesting NSA-like spectra of signals caught over Leningrad

There are two predictable channels, all active this weekend, understandably as Russia got all hot and bothered and rattled sabres at Poland.

In the second screenshot, the Wave application in the Skip One Sample mode shed some light on the high rate transmission session.

The Code300 equipment have been useless. Note the characteristic flower pattern of the SK material. A while later a directional info0matiuon has been obtained, placing the source of the signals somewhere in the environs of the Kirov shipyards, aimed at Russian cruisers scurrying around in the Baltic just east of Poland.

A little bit of Russian diplograms across the Baltic during the Georgian fray

Just to be cheeky, hereunder I bring you a sample of a Russian Diplomatic message sent this Saturday most likely either from an antenna farm in northern Russia, or from a Slava-class cruiser based in Kaliningrad westwards to an embassy in Copenhagen or London.

Their are still using the true and tried 20-tone MFSK.
Here is the transmission decoded:

33333333333YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY3YYYYYYYYRRRRRRRRYYYYYYYY RRYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYRRRRRRRRYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY3YYYYYYYYYYYS9
block sync
44444444444444444444
block sync
825 825 825 1 825 825 825 1 825 825 825 1 S9S9S9S9S9S9S9S9S99S9S9S9S9S9S9
block sync
44444444444444444444
block sync
4MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 01853 03163 29583 62608 85848 20890 32229 47135 33407 01770 17829 29581 45886 18313 64193 84251 03877 14691 85520 51668 51392 97315 92028 58289 97780 86264 57560 26044 56769 76566 71984 78741 96125 82152 92638 18078 80783 12147 82868 94553 00621 94296 11650 04592 05130 05154 30534 14159 15260 64338 11984 67929 77386 73687 77328 81014 75848 43731 69507 83252 17342 71045 68924 65525
block sync
99481 76088 79303 0M871 25937 10116 72734 07113 02604 26174 70409 28835 20009 94220 29759 32628 57604 26642 95017 00115 92616 89331 70493 19462 18539 99399 08531 22668 28656 34746 19424 34051 05205 36361 55293 42453 81253 59983 79552 32527 87120 93334 03071 37980 89417 59675 09082 71198 60251 23574 49641 12374 97985 37176 01615 59203 00971 42814 93426985912 91039 16372 84963 09709
block sync
40051 20229 01134 87393 63119 79089 92815 76114 32335 14460 08450 53790 14615 18880 33373 39165 61725 05102 28457 98259 795M3 91277 30424 83432 07990 96001 68014 41459 25815 92978 49783 94985 01336 45337 17339 73020 77269 33542++++++++++++++++++3333333333

Again, this is a decoded transmission, not unbuttoned, (not deciphered). Of course, they are using a one-time pad, (note the 5-digit groups)

Also worthy of note is the S6 and S9 number station-like S code, which is associated with the Russian Man numbers station known for saying funny and innocent things in English.

How you can never bank goodwill with bears

There is a lot of things abuzz both sides of the ditch. I don't mean the latest warmongering by Russia, or Georgia. There are reports that Selma on the Baltic is really abuzz for the forth day straight, because it is a military district and a base for naval operations. Russians afraid to leave their back door open?

Russian AGIs (SVVs) sailed westwards, as if the Britain's one-funny-cruiser navy could attack her. Or Swedish closed-cycle subs would launch heretofore unknown Swedish cruise missiles (probably and suitable named Thorstann, or Thorshammer),

My friends behind the bear's curtain assert that this no cover-your-back state of readiness. Really. the clsoest US aircraft carrier is busy dodging Iranian model paper-and-glue airplanes.

Russians, namely Putin, are exploiting hte opportunity in this turmoil, as most intelligence agencies THINK they are using their HUMINT, SIGINT and ELINT on catching whatever breadcrumbs that are falling off the bear's feeding trough. Russians are achieving their goals in Georgia, but northwards, in the Baltic, and in the Red Banner Northern Fleet's own swimming pool they are busy investing in their reaffirming their exclusive access rightn to the Arctic.

Don't forget Sweden's refusal to allow routing of the Northern Stream (Russia's northern pipeline) to feed the Europe.Besides the tit-for-tat diplo-military posturing (also keep in mind that Russia, as USSR and Czar's Empire has NEVER banked goodwill). Swedes were smart, calling Russians' intention to use the pipeline as a excuse to place SOSUS-like high-tech sensors close to Skaane shores. Russian AGIs, oceanographic ships (the academics) and, actually, the cable ships themselves have been spotted waltzing up and down the Bornholm corridor.

While Medved Prived is moving tin soldiers across the cardboard, the electromagnetic spectrum over the Karelia and the Eystrasalt (the Baltic Sea to the Scandinavians, or Vikings) is full of inteersting digital activity. I need to brush up on my FSKs and screenshot application, I means Fireshot, a great Firefox add-on. Thanks for the heads up through the post.

A comment requested to withhold the BAE spy materials from posting

I have received a comment that was intended as a message, with a request that I rewrite it to eliminate any idiosyncratic features of the sender.

He strongly recommended that I do not post the BAE letter circulating in Moscow (see the previous post):

I don't know what you do for a living, but if you need to keep making beer money with this blog, it would be in your better interests to avoid publishing the BAE materials. There are people in Russia and UK who know how to black hat your blog till it gets barely a visitor a month.

Thanks you, Mr. Compassionate. Not that I am afraid, I undestand I need to prepare the materials better.

Secret status report

I have been really busy, more than I thought I'd be considering the summertime and the approaching vacation season. I have a lot of content for upcoming posts, the content itself not quite ready for the prime time, since it needs to be sanitized and the names of the innocent to be protected. You just never know where Putin's plutonium men will pop up next.

The visitor map is rather simple. More than have the visitors came from the US, and the rest from Russia and UK. Less than 15 percent remaining are random, or not so random hits from Germany and other European countries.

I know for sure not to post network host names that visited this blog, since it has caused some consternation that was beyond my expectations or aspirations for this blog.

Up ahead - more stuff on the BAE espionage affair, some more of Putin's personal, politically relevant correspondence, and other products of Russia's pathological megalomania.

Any requests?

BAE secret document

I am still working on formatting and cleaning up the Gazprom employee list. While I am at it, the famed BAE secret information that has been pilfered out of the Basildon plant has is being circulated in Russia, and I have been sent a teaser sample of the info:

The signature is unmistakable.

I am not interested in divulging British secrets. The point of the post is to shed light on the extent, the depth and ease of GRU and FSB penetration into Western defense establishment.

The 1st installment of Gazprom employee list

After a lengthy absence from this electronic world, I am reporting back, and have obtained a partial list of Gazprom's top brass:

Круглов Андрей Вячеславович
заместитель Председателя Правления, начальник финансово-экономического Департамента ОАО "Газпром"

Заместитель Председателя Совета:
Казанская Ольга Александровна,
первый Вице-Президент ГПБ (ОАО)

Члены Совета:

Канцеров Фарид Масхутович,
заместитель Председателя Правления ГПБ (ОАО)

Майоров Владимир Владимирович,
генеральный директор ОАО "Белтрансгаз"

Кац Юрий Семенович,
исполнительный вице-президент - начальник Департамента регионального бизнеса ГПБ (ОАО)

Мешков Александр Анатольевич,
заместитель руководителя Аппарата Правления – советник Председателя Правления ОАО "Газпром"

Мягков Петр Андреевич,
руководитель Департамента по управлению делами Аппарата Правления ОАО "Газпром"

Озерец Александр Владимирович,
министр энергетики Республики Беларусь

Селявко Валерий Владимирович,
советник Правления ОАО "Белгазпромбанк"

Председатель Правления:
Бабарико Виктор Дмитриевич

Задойко Алексей Михайлович,
член Правления, первый заместитель Председателя Правления

Добролет Сергей Михайлович,
член Правления, заместитель Председателя Правления

Ильясюк Александр Петрович,
член Правления, заместитель Председателя Правления

Кузьмич Дмитрий Михайлович,
член Правления, заместитель Председателя Правления

Комир Людмила Геннадьевна,
член Правления, заместитель Председателя Правления

Шабан Сергей Васильевич,
член Правления, заместитель Председателя Правления

Пивовар Татьяна Михайловна,
член Правления, главный бухгалтер

Станкевич Вячеслав Зиновьевич,
член Правления, директор Департамента внутреннего контроля

Сажин Владимир Васильевич,
член Правления, директор Департамента Аппарата правления

Bae document winds up in Russia

I have a more detailed information about the following arrest. As soon as the pertinent passages get doubled checked and translated, the information will be appended to this post.

The offenses are said to have happened while Mr Parr was working for BAe Systems and Avionics based in Basildon, Essex.

The former soldier and father-of-two is accused of nine charges under the Official Secrets Act of obtaining information "prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state" between 1 January and 23 March of this year.

He is also accused of stealing a CD-Rom containing sensitive data relating to the Hostile Artillery Locator (Halo) project.

Mr Parr, a former test co-ordinator for BAe, was arrested in Southend on 22 March in a joint operation involving police and the security services.

The charges Mr Parr faces carry a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison.

BAe Systems and Avionics employs 1,300 people and is one of the UK's leading suppliers of civil and military electronic systems.

Video identifies GRU generals

After a month long hiatus, I am back, posting, in the middle of a long and tedious project. What prompted me to post is an email from a distant acquaintance pointing out that several names on the list of GRU brass has appeared on this video.

See Ivanov describing what he believes is an ingenious security feature that refuses to let out a pass card that failed to lock an interior door, at 4:24 in the video.

My acquaintance says that these generals are identifiable in the video (some patronymics are not available or in question, as marked):

Васильков, Алексей Ф(?) -Vasilkov, Alexey F(?), visible at locations 3:19, 4:06,

Романенко, Леонид -Romanenko, Leonid, at 3:19, 4:06,

Гурьянов, Александр - Guryanov, Alexandr, at 5:13, 5:18, 6:14

Венгереш, Виталий С(?)- Vengeresh, Vitaly S(?), at 5:18, 6:14, 6:19,

Лыков, Роман - Lykov, Roman, at 6:14, 6:19

Гуща, Юрий Андреевич Gushcha, Yury Andreevich, at 6:14, 6:19

Головастик, Виктор Денисович - Golovastik, Victor Denisovich, at 6:14, 6:19

Долгих, А. П.(?) - Dolgikh, A. P.(?) location 6:54 in video (the lone general snacking in the background while Putin and Ivanov are picking out a cake)




Of course, your input is welcome - you can always leave comment as an anonymous.

compare with the list of FSB A-K, K-Z

Russia breaks Swiss banks

I launched another bot on Friday morning, and a trifling matter of the day distracted me from following up on the bot's findings. I remembered it just now, on Sunday evening, and, instead of another harvest of secret information on Russia's communication and naval matters, the raw text returned contained the names of Alexey Kudrin, Sergey Ignatiev, Alexey Ulyukaev, Dmitri Pankin, Alexander Gorban and Nadezhda Ivanova (Алексей Кудрин, Сергей Игнатьев, Алексей Улюкаев, Дмитрий Панкин, Александр Горбань и Надежда Иванова).

The reason the bot found these names was that the text originated in a Russian Government's interoffice memo discussing the forthcoming visit of these Russian financial official to Washington, DC. The team , it seems, is to participate in the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. This all seems to be innocuously Russian, or even nouveau-Russian. Except there appears a sprinkling of neo-Russian words that my acquaintances from Moscow have identified as egotistically pompous proclamation of money withdrawals. Except the withdrawals were from such easily identifiable insittutions as UBS and Credit Suisse, and among the destination were Nekrasovian pseudonyms for Gazprom, and LUKoil(!!!???)

It comes as no suprise that the news now is percolating through the printed media, and, firstly, of course, through the blogosphere (as confirmed by Huffington Post) that the UBS and Credit Suisse and about to writedowns (or writeoffs) of loss, the first in five years, as a result of unprecedented market conditions. It appears that, concerted or not, Switzerland became too small for the Russian Bear's wallet, and might be assigned the status of a quaint and picturesque winter resort.

Hutch's E-mail application

Associative memory brings back an episode of the Internet's nascent days, 1995-early 1996. Hutch asked me to accompany him on a electronic mail procurement mission.

We knocked on the door of a Palmer Park apartment walk-up, and were led inside a turmeric-fumigated abode. The Indian engineer, a software magician, was uneasy, since it became clear to me that he owed Hutch a big favor for an INS matter. Hutch asked in no uncertain terms if in a matter of three (3!) weeks he would have a program he could carry around on a floppy diskette (1995, remember? No sign of USB), which would allow him "to send electronic mail from any computer" connected to the internet and having a floppy drive.

And thus the Indian wrote the magic code. Hutch used it mainly at random terminals of public libraries. The peculiarity of e-mails which he sent was that the headers From: field contained a domain of a web site he had to be on to send the e-mail.
I remember seeing headers like

From: Curious George CGN @07.22.1995.politics.cnn.com

I think this was the coolest e-mail application I ever seen. It was just like my bot that has been working wonders for me, see Russian Torpedo, Putin's Letter, espionage search results, FSB Employee list, FSB secrets, and Bot writing.

Smoking Gun in the Russian Torpedo Intrigue

This letter might as well be the smoking gun that sets off all the alarms and sends out the message that Russian weapons are being traded on the grey market, to the highest bidder, which is Iran.

The most unlikely continuation of the Russian torpedo affair (originating with the VA-111 Shkval) can be followed to the most unlikely but logical location: the landlocked country of Kyrgyzstan.

Performing cursory searches after the last post, I became distracted with the tangential thought: for sure, if I launched a bot with naval keywords like torpedo, Norman Polmar, Putin, Iran, previously compiled network locations, and search algorithms for file meta data, I would surely find something more interesting. Translating the keywords into Russian, I promptly sent the bot on its way and instantly received a list of results that included this scan and a DOC file.

Discussing the finds with knowledgeable sources, I can state that the torpedo affair takes place in the landlocked country of Kyrgyzstan, where the former USSR in its infinite wisdom based a torpedo design bureau in the country that has no navigable waters, which, also coincidentally, is responsible for design and construction of high-tech centrifuges (Iran double connection!). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the facility became a corporation ("Dastan OAO")

What is more or less clear after the in-depth analysis of the letter is that the letter writer, a whistle blower working as a software engineer describes intricacies of the torpedo software being the interest to other countries,and, due to the subcontractor politics, Kyrgyzstan's debts to the Russian Federation; and North Korea, India, and China being interested in the torpedo's control circuitry, some industrial espionage has been taking place in favor of an unexpected, high-bidder party, which is Iran.

The author of the letter seems to have alerted his country's military counterintelligence agency, which resulted in an answer (the image above) having an aloof, condescending, almost an informal, "thanks-but-no-thanks" tone. Business as usual. Back to work. Do not worry. Good man.

******

The letter to Kyrgyzstan's Military Counterintelligence Agency (use Google Translate applet in the upper right corner to translate the entire post into English):

Page 1

Я работал с октября 2006 года по октябрь 2007 года в Открытом Акционерном Обществе "ТНК "Дастан"(далее просто "Дастан") в должности инженера-программиста. "Дастан" - в советские времена назывался сначала "физприборы", затем "приборо- строительный_завод" и подчинялся минсудпрому. И в советские времена, и постсоветские времена, на "Дастане" делали в основном противолодочные торпеды, а также немного делали ширпотреб - медицинские центрифуги. Причем "Дастан" - монополист в области серийного производства противолодочных торпед(правда при советах на нем делали только системы наведения для торпед - Головные Отсеки). Сразу скажу, что за год работы на "Дастане" мне поручали делать софт реального времени(штатный) только для ширпотреба(для MCS-51), и я не имел служебного формального доступа к режимной(закрытой) информации. Но кое-что удалось тем не менее разузнать. Во второй половине 90-х, "Дастан" оказался монопольным владельцем конструкторско-технологической документации(КТД) на изделие "СЭТ-92M", название означает - Самонаводящаяся Электрическая Торпеда. Сразу отмечу, что в этой торпеде есть активный гидролокатор(входит в ГО, см. далее), а метод пеленгации цели - фазовый. Вышеуказанный комплект КТД на СЭТ-92M был продан "Дастаном" в КНР, а затем сами СЭТ-92M производились "Дастаном" и им же продавались в Индию. В торпеду СЭТ-92M устанавливали Головной Отсек(ГО) имевший идентификатор "Керамика" (такое название, видимо из-за широкого применения в нем пъезокерамических преобразователей: вибраторов-излучателей и вибраторов-приемников). "Керамика" была реализована на элементной базе, соответствующей ЭВМ третьего поколения - Интегральные_Микросхемы(ИМС) Средней_Интеграционной_Степени(СИС), то есть логика на 564(немного 533), а аналоговые куски - на 140. Такие операции, как: фильтрации(согласованные,несогласованные) , генерация , интегрирование, дифференцирование, компарирование, и т.д. делались на аналоговых схемах. Усиление делалось на транзисторных схемах. Бортовой контроллер не имел программного(микропрограммного) управления. По частично достоверной информации, "Керамика" была содрана с соответствующего Головного Отсека американской торпеды Мк43(или Мк44), то есть советы("Гидроприбор") попросту подобрали подходящую советскую элементную базу(на конец 80-х). К началу нового тысячелетия, ГО "Керамика" окончательно морально устарела. Менеджмент "Дастана" решил заполучить современную ГО, в которой и обработка гидроакустических сигналов, и все управление торпедой было бы реализовано на однокристальной микро-ЭВМ типа "TMSxxxx"(для тех кто не знает - это микропроцессоры класса "DSP"-digital_signal_proccessing). Но на "Дастане" не было специалистов в области создания софта реального времени для задач цифровой обработки гидроакустических сигналов(да что там задачи ЦОС, на "Дастана" не было даже специалиста для создания софта реального времени для систем автостабилизации - САУ центрифугой). Поэтому менеджмент "Дастана" заключил полулегальный контракт с секретной фирмой "НПП "Редан"(расположена то ли в Москве, то ли в ближнем Подмосковье) на создание вышеуказанного программного продукта.
Page 2

Исполнители от "НПП "Редан" поставили условие - штатный софт в файловом виде, созданный ими, НЕ будет ПОЛНОСТЬЮ передан на "Дастан", а всего лишь "Дастан" получает ПОЛНЫЙ штатный софт ТОЛЬКО в виде законченной прошивки памяти чипа ОКМЭВМ(в качестве ОКМЭВМ была выбрана ADSP2191 from Analog Devices corp., ОКМЭВМ - однокристальная микро ЭВМ). Причем, редановцы добились программно-аппаратными методами необходимого уровня защиты прошивки от неснкционированного ее считывания. Также, редановцы заявили(разумеется приватно), что потенциальным покупателям новой торпеды - китайцам,индийцам,вьетнамцам и т.д. абсолютно неинтересно "железо" торпеды, им не стоит труда быстро организовать массовое производство торпед конструкцию которой они могут попросту содрать. Покупателям пока проблематично создать необходимый прикладной софт, как тот, что могут гарантированно делать редановцы.

В настоящий момент, Кыргызстан имеет значительный госдолг перед РФ. В настоящий момент, блокирующий пакет акций "Дастана" принадлежит Кыргыстану-государ- ству. В течении как минимум 10 последних лет, РФ не отказалась бы от получения "Дастана" в свою собственность(до сих пор в РФ нет подобного предприятия), а в последнии два-три года эти просьбы-требования стали весьма настоятельными... В разработку ГО нового поколения(ее идентификатор - "Керамика Модернизированная"), "Дастан" вложил более миллиона $ US . Page 3

"Керамика Модернизированная", как и ее предшественница, осуществляет поиск цели, а затем наведение на цель активным методом: активного типа гидролокатор ПОСТОЯННО испускает зондирующие посылки, и ПОСТОЯННО(разумеется здесь под этим термином подразумевается в режиме разделения времени, как и у всякого импульсного радара) принимает отраженные гидроакустические сигналы, и ПОСТОЯННО производит ОБРАБОТКУ и АНАЛИЗ принятого сигнала для "выуживания" из него полезной(необходимой) инфы(спектральные функции и сигнатуры, временные функции и сигнатуры, пространственно-фазовые функции и сигнатуры). Это ОДНОЗНАЧНО дает принципиальную возможность ДИСТАНЦИОННОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ торпедой. ДИСТАНЦИОННОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ торпедой, разумеется возможно лишь при соответствующей реализации. Можно предложить такой вариант реализации. ГО излучает периодически ТОН-сигнал(проманипулированная гармоника), и соответственно получает отраженный от цели ТОН-сигнал(кроме отражения от цели есть масса других, но помеховых отражений - реверберации, интерференций ревербераций, рефракции, дифрации, которые отфильтровываются в ГО в той или иной степени, и не изменяют сути проблемы) , если использовать манипулирующую функцию(а это дискретная ф-я) в качестве кода некой команды, то можно заложить в бортовой контроллер(в его память) некоторое множество "черных" команд, и при наличии в принятом сигнале манипулирующей функции соответ- ствующей такой команде, эта команда(из "черного" списка) будет исполняться. "Черный" список может включать например такую команду, как команда типа "меня_не_видно", или команда типа "пройти_в_стороне_от_меня" и т.д. Таким образом, чтобы пользователь торпеды был уверен в предсказуемости пове- дения торпеды, он должен проанализировать(проэмулировать) ПОЛНОСТЬЮ весь штатный софт на всем наборе входных параметров(аргументов) всех программ(подпрограмм, процедур, модулей и т.д.). В противном случае, он будет применять торпеду с "сюрпризом". Буду признателен за ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ и КОМПЕТЕНТНОЕ мнение об ошибочности/верности моих рассуждений и выводов по проблеме "сюрприза". Итак, ПРОБЛЕМА_№1 - принципиально возможен ли "сюрприз" ? Далее. Предположим, что потенциальный индийский покупатель осведомлен о принципиальной возможности "сюрпризов" в предлагаемой ему торпеде. Согласится ли он тогда покупать такую "шкатулку с сюрпризом" ? Поэтому, ПРОБЛЕМА_№2 - согласится ли некто купить серъезную партию таких торпед с "сюрпризом"(разумеется, раз употреблено слово "сюрприз", то это означает, что по крайней мере часть кодов штатного софта недоступна для покупателя). И наконец, ПРОБЛЕМА_№3 - можно ли считать, что какая-то часть менеджмента "Дастана" (или все они) являются агентами Российских спецслужб, или они всего лишь лохи(абсолютно некомпетентные в проблемах современных систем вооружений) ? Буду признателен за ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ и КОМПЕТЕНТНОЕ мнение об ошибочности/верности моих рассуждений и выводов по проблемам №1,№2,№3

I have omitted the whistleblower's computer ID and its network IP information.

Russian stealth FFG and other Naval deals

The Russians' cheap , but hardly a stealth knock-off stolen from US designs and Jane's pictures, Astrakhan has been sighted cavorting in the Azov sea.

Details of Russian military export deals are becoming ever more interesting.

For example, according to Hutch's sources, Indian Navy was so dissatisfied with the bargain-basement sale quality of Russia's Gorshkov, that the e-mail was written to that effect to a Ministry in New Delhi in English, not in a usual Indic. Russian' being their usual persnickety spooks, invested thousands of man-hours into their diplomatic attache intelligence work, to scoop up the e-mail. The e-mail, however, was subtly forwarded to Hutch's friends, who have also revealed that the Indians were markedly dissatisfied with the Kilo class SSK purchased from Russia for petrorubles from Mr. Petroruble himself, Czar Putin.

High profile names that caused Hutch to salivate was Alexey Duchovich, and Koshelev, their officer ranks unknown.

Che+Vodka=Le Carre

I never thought that the Che post struck a chord in many readers' sensibilities. I am glad I was rather neutral, though I by no means a fan of the commie terrorist.

One of my online acquantainces that has read this blog from afar (Poland, that is) turns out to be a character that stepped out from a Le Carre's Carla, or Karla novel. He has pointed me to a JPG of a morning-after following an all-night Zubrovka (or Żubrówka) drinking binge.

The interesting part of the image is not easily discernible, our ex-Agencja Wywiadu/KGB associate writes. It is not the coincidental poster of Che. It is a page from a one-time pad carelessly stuck onto one of shelves. The man who stored it not shpown in the picture, but he was a graduate student at a the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies of Warsaw U. (hence the cartographic art supplies conveniently disguising fieldcraft activities) who decidedly failed his beiong groomed into a cushy position at Polish Secret Service.

Putin's Exotic Tropo Site

This is the center for Russia's Tropospheric Radio Relay network called Sever ("North," ironically, it is truly severed from the rest of the country), near Norilsk. According to my source, besides the typical Gorizont-M and TP-120 systems , it has unique, custom produced signals processing equipment supplied by a group of military ("OOO" and "unitary") enterprises that also include the famed Tochmash of the silenced handgun fame.

The area is off-limits, though the landscape is too wintry and forbidding throughout most of he year, and its perimeter is studded with "photography prohibited" signs. The source says the military sections of the Russian radio spectrum are exceptionally active (thanks to Putin, no doubt) around the installation.

The center, despite its high security status, responds to anyone who knows how to exploit the tropospheric communications technology whenever the center's callsign "Луч" (LOOCH) is heard on its hailing frequency.

The installation and the network ares staffed by employees sent directly from the Moscow Electrotechnical Communications Institute, now MTUSI; Bonch-Bruevich Saint-Petersburg Electrotechnical Communications Institute, now SPbGUT; Minsk Radiotechnical Institute, now BGUIR; and Sverdlovsk Communications and Electronics Technical School, now UrTISI.

Che's hands still at work

We all know that Che is dead. It seems, however, that his persona is not quite ready to leave this wolrd, and I don't mean what is already found in the laudatory passages in Cuban text books and party banners. As far as we have known, Felix Rodriquez had tracked down and had Che killed in Bolivian jungle. We also know that soon thereafter he cut off Che's hands for positive identification. The hands might have been returned to Cuba and worshiped together with the rest of his body.


What I have been told by my source in Moscow (not from among the ones that provided me with great photo recce of interesting places like the KGB in Minsk , the French Embassy, a radar, and a radio surveillance center) is that they (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) have also
pilfered a supposedly US Federal document (assuming it to be FBI or CIA) claiming that various white collar crimes committed across the USA wherein the fingerprints wherever lifted were identical to Che's.

The source asked me in an e-mail (using a disposable e-mail service) how could that be.

I say it is very simple, knowing the crowd associated with Hutch and Felix Rodriquez. Hutch is notorious for having used the hands he cut off unidentified dead vagrants for high-profile break-ins, the ones that have never become Watergate Scandals.

Has anyone been able to figure out Putin's garbled letter? Since I moderate posting here, I will not publish your messages containing unsanitized information.

Russian list of US codewords, Putin's letter

In this post, new stuff that the bot fetched:

• Bits and pieces of a Russain classified letter
• Russian-compiled list of US codewords, for evryone's entertainment

The mysteriously delicious garble

I forgot about the adding to the post on the Russian Sigint station on Cuba, and sent out a bot with keywords in Russian (the list that was prepared by a good friend that speaks excellent Voronezh Russian (plus Chinese, Spanish, Tagalog, Persian, Arabic, Japanese, Hebrew [always a shadow of Mossad, isn't there?], German and Norwegian, has American citizenship, was born in a Moslem country and has a perfect Nordic look - all of which make his adventures fun and a great learning experience.

Thereupon I have opened the bot GUI, copy-pasted into the string window about 50(sic!) keywords in Russian, which equivalent to CODEWORD, SIGNATURE, PUTIN, IRAN, AGREEMENT, SECRET, GOLD, DOLLAR, RUBLE, USA, USN, etc (военно-морские силы, код, подпись, связь, валюта, соглашение, секретные)

The bot was out in the wild no more than 600 milliseconds after the 1.2 second it took to reach main(?) servers, when it returned (faster than previously, in the instances of the FSB Directory, or the first results) a harvest that included several raw TXT files, two of which contained live, classified content. First file name was IRANTRANS.DOC which, at the time, I had no patience to unbutton. I have copied unto here the only paragraph containing legible Russian material:

доКŃ�Ń�виŃ�оНŃ�и¶я~ ЃуК‚УщКСЕ Đ˝Đž, Ń�огОднŃ�пл.ВосстанияŃ�Мо ПОМнО Ń�ĐşВасильеостровская аСаўчЄ Ч КДПО ?1іы юЁ:Ń�Ń�, ГУФ Ń�Ń�Đž CD-Ń�окОŃ�ПетропольĐ´ĐľŃ� Он и в Đ�Ń�Ń�икоЮЫ‡ЩyзљЭIФ¤o-w C&'D-Ń�ДрезденокОхекаŃ�Đ´ĐľŃ�, Đ°КЗакПО,Ленинакан,18П.З ]3Đ´Đž Ń�Ń�ОвнŃ� High End Они пОка Đ˝ĐГУКľ дОйŃ�аНиŃ�Ń�. Đ� Ń�Đ°Đş, Marantz DR700 ПОМоŃ� ĐžŃ�комитетчиком десятогоŃ�Ńвосьмого�ĐľŃ�Ń�ĐМГИМО˛ĐťŃ�Ń�Ń� СапиŃ�Ń� Ń� Đ°ĐТЭЧ˝Đ°ĐťĐžĐłĐžĐ˛ИстихбаратОгО иНĐ�иŃ�Ń�ОвОгО вŃ�Ода (ОпŃОАПО ПЗКПП ĐşĐo.СРЕДНИЙ�иŃ�ĐľŃ�СпНГРУ žĐłĐž иНĐДальне-Восточный,округ 55 отряд 7 п.з кОаĐhtw-=2ş;038Ń�Đ¸ШЏщ†ы wг)Đ°ĐťŃ�нОгО)105-й на Ń�поŃ�иаНŃ�Đ˝Ń�Đľ ľŃ�Đş"ĐźŃ�СŃ�каНŃ�Đ˝Ń

the text also contained the only link next to a military unit designation ("ТЭЧ 979 иап") that pointed to this photo:

the link (http://scucin-avia.narod.ru/liotchiki/albom_kirichekvlad/albom_kirichekvladfiles/postrojenije-tech.jpg)

characters in purple are of questionable interest ("Marantz" could be intriguing, though: a modified CD recorder?)

пл.Восстания Vosstania Sq., a St. Peterssburg subway station 1
Васильеостровская Vasilieostrovskaya, a St. Petersburg subway station 2
КДПО a KGB/FSB uniut associated with border patrol
Петрополь according to my source - a bar near station 2 frequented by the SpB University's foreign language and middle east studies students
Дрезден Dresden - Putin's foreign service assignment?
КЗакПО,Ленинакан,18П.З a border guard outpost in Armenia
ГУК undetermined acronym
комитетчиком десятого...восьмого "KGB (associate from the) 10th...8th (directorate)"
10th directorate is uncertain, thought the 8th was the crypto and communications department
МГИМО the prominent Moscow State Foreign Relations Insitute
ТЭЧ a Technical Management Unit
Истихбарат Istihbarat, the Libyan Security Agency
ОАПО ПЗКПП ...o.СРЕДНИЙ a border outpost near Srednyy (no time to look up)
СпНГРУ a GRU diplomatic/intelligence/DATT unit
Дальне-Восточный,округ 55 отряд 7 п.з a border guard unit ID in the Russian Far East
105-й a KGB, then FSB or GRU unit associated with DATT service

What is this file? What kind of text is this? A garbled crypto, innocently de-garbled by the bot? Someone said that it is a garbled Cyrillic embedded into Polish. You can only guess. I will have more definite analysis of this material in later posts.

Russian-compiled list of US codewords

The second source's file name is FLOTKODOVO.doc, and it contains many of the codwords in ordiginal English.

After consulting with a friend who is in USN Reserves, I realized that the list is that of US Naval and Coast Guard codewords used by a US Joint Task Force (Four?) in the Caribbean-Atlantic. The Russians, or Russkies, as I like calling them critters on this blog, no offense intended ( it is my Southern charm background shinin' through), must have done a good homework of radio monitoring and put together this rather interesting compilation. Due to translation and formatting, it is non-alphabetical.

The Russian understanding of the meaning was very much off, for example, they could not know that BILLY BUD meant a situation where sexual crime was committed aboard a searchable vessel. A Russian listener associated it almost literally to a billy club ("битой" - with a baseball bat ?!) I s that how they opearate: when in doubt -fudge it?

Many of these were easy for the Russian to know/figure out/ distill out of Google, but there are things like BILLY BUD, where I provide the Russian interpretation and the real meaning used by the US:

RESISTOR сопротивление, resistance - no clue, actually: a non-cooperative boater
CAPACITOR конденсатор, capacitor - really: a vessel with a probable cause for search
DIODE диод, diode - really: Dead in Water, drifting vessel, no way on
COIL катушка, coild, really: suspicious
TRANSISTOR -really: passenger vessel
POWER SUPPLY - no clue, really a vessel with contraband
9-SHOT - неизвестный p. (unknown meaning, no clue) really:port turn
MONITOR неизвестный p. really US Coast Guard
OREO Russians have no clue, but it is P3 Orion
I/O no clue, but it is: INS matter
FUSE no clue, US Customs
BUMP "push", no clue, really: hail someone by a click of an non-secure radio
UTL no clue, but: unable to locate
LL no clue, land line
CAR-LEFT , no clue, - left sideband of CB, non-obvious way of communicating
SOS no clue, but, US Secreatry of State
NCIC "Mational Crime Computer System" almost right: National Crime Information Center
PCW Russian got it right, but it means more: a violation of Pemit to Carry Concealed weapons
PSTIM no clue, possession of stimulants
PDOWN no clue, possession of donwers,
UILT no clue, under influence of liquor or THC
SCARAB Russian:"designer boat", really an innocent boat running scared
CIGARETTE Russian: "designer boat", really a guilty, arrestable boat running away
POPEYE, no clue, but it is am exerienced/retired sailor/boater
BUG no clue, it is an illegal immigrant/stowaway/INS problem
RAM no clue, cargo hold
ROM no clue, radio shack, radio report
C-NOTE Russians: $100, really: 100 gallons. tons
K - Russians: 1000, almost right - 1000 tons, gallons
ANALOG -no clue, really a bulk carrier
DIGITAL - no clue, really a container ship
CYCLE - no clue, really a round trip
HIGHWAY -no clue, really a plotted course
ZIGZAG - Russians: zigzagging course. Almost there: suspicious, avoidance course
BLUE - no clue, US Coast Guard
BLACK no clue, USN
8-BALL - Russians: captured, confiscated. Not exactly: a shootable target
BEERFRAME - no clue, really a confiscation and arrests
PHONE - no clue, really a backtalking subject
CAPTOR - Russians" captive torpedo; really an ex-captain, -military, smart attitude
CAPITAL - no clue, really a captain's personal cash
XPIG -Russians, a very creative guess: an ex-policeman; really a ship's piggy bank
FLOYD no clue, Florida
GEORGE - no clue, really Georgia
SCOTT -no clue, SC
NICK -no clue, really NC
VIRGIL - no clue, really VA
DALE - no clue, really DE
MARLIN - no clue, really MD
FIL - no clue, really PA
NUGENT - no clue (funny!) really NJ
ROSIE - no clue, really: Roosevelt Roads
KAY -no clue, really Key West
MAY -Russians: Mayport Naval Base; really: Miami
MOVIE - no clue, really Hollywood, FL
ESTEE no clue, really Ft. Lauderdale (think cosmetics)
WINNIEPEG - no clue (?) West Palm Beach
CHAPPA-Q no clue (and no chance -editor) Palm Beach (think Kennedy)
VR no clue, Vero Beach
CAPE COD - Russians went for the obvious, but is is Cape Canaveral (think Kennedy)
INDY - no clue - Daytona
MAYNOT - no clue, though it is Jacksonville Mayport NAS
COKE -no clue, really: Pensacola
TSAR - no clue, though they could try: CZAR is St. Petersburg FL
GITMO -Russians git right, it's a no brainer, Guantanamo
AT&T -no clue, it is US BATF
MOUSE - no clue, it stands for a radar report
MODEM -no clue: a secure comm channel
ROTA -US NAS Rota, Spain
PHIBRON -Russians got it right: USN amphibious Squadron
DATT -Russians correct: defense attache system
SIG -Russians went literal: "signal", whereas it is USN NAS Sigonella
AISSO - Russians Googled it: Automated Informations Systems Security officer
WIZZO -no clue: weapons systems officer
TACO - no clue, though they listened to S-3, P-3 talk- it is a tactical air combat coordinator

You never know what these bots would turn up next.

OSNAZ (ОСНАЗ) SIGINT center in Cuba

The following photos are of the OSNAZ regiment (в/ч) 54234-В, Lourdes. More detailed shots of the installation interior and the men to follow as they (gradually) become available.





The white building in the center of the photo below is the main monitoring center. Here the enlisted servicemen manned short-wave communication. Equipment repair shack is to the left. The antenna farm is in the background. The main antenna could be rotated to fine-tune the reception.

Russians reactivating their SIGINT sites?- another secret list

I just played with the idea of sending out our spybot again, just for the heck of it. It came back with this wild and cool, NSA-grade material. Some of the bot returns is in a confusing encoding that would not paste here intact. I translated wherever I could, with the help of our good old military adviser. This center does not seem to be on the list, nor this radar site is associated with anything herebelow.

The bot reports of GRU units seem to be poised for activation, relocation or inventory.

The (!) GUDOK (ГУДОК), 215- or (в/ч) 34608 th regiment
309 ЦРПУ ОСНАЗ (the central radio transmitting center)
250 ОРТП ОСНАЗ ГСВГ г. Штендаль (the OSNAZ unit in the city of Stendahl)
GRU's БП630 and the 16th KGB directorate (управления КГБ). Some of our specialists says this is not ОсНаз, but a special СС service (специальная служба).
The following regiment numbers:
в/ч 51952 (in Nerastannoye, near Moscow, Chekhov region - Нерастанное, Московская обл., Чеховский р-н)
В/ч 61519 in Novosibirsk region, Новосибирск обл.
в/ч 61615 in Rustavi (Georgia?)Рустави (Гардабани)
в/ч 61330 Odessa, Ukraine г. Одесса, п.Акаржа/ Аккарже, and Ovidiopol (Овидиополь-2)
в/ч 61608 Tzaritzino, (Царицыно)

The data groups below is a result of the bot having converted a table to text, a la MS Windows.
The order of the data - the number of the communication center, the name of the communication center, the locale, military outpost/regiment/detachment number, the channels (ТЛГ/ЗАС/Титан)/frequencies, and activity notes.

215 GUDOK, Moscow reg., Klimovsk, 34608; 210,230,255,285,280 (training only), 220, 200, 205, 265, 260, 245;
210 SHIPUN, Petersburg reg., Gatchina, Tayvorovo, 41480; 215, 230,255
230 GRANULATZIA, Murmansk reg., Kildinstroy, 34630 215,255,210
255 JUMPER, Komi, Vorkuta, 34575; 215,210,285
285 TELEGA, Krasnoyarsk reg., Tiksi, 14145; 215, 255, 240, 220
280 NATRIT, Chukotka, Beringovsky, 51595; Channel for training, alternatively for the use by ZVEZDA
220 NAVESKA, Khabarovsk reg., Sergeyevka, 48260; 215, 240, 285
200 SPOLOKH, ex-NARCOTIC,Irkutsk reg., Oyek, 51870; 215, 220, 205, 240
205 GEOTHERMIA, Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata reg., Shengeldy, 48253 (86621); 215,200. 265
265 BEDRENNYY, Turkmenia, Ashkhabad reg., Geok-Tepe, 34639; 215,260,205
260 RAVNYY, Georgia, Gardebani, Kajory, 51868; 215, 265, 245,
245 PRIBORKA, Ukraine, Odessa, 42028; 215, 260, 210,
408 LAYBA, (ех LASTIC), Ryazan reg., Spassk-Ryazansky, 02565 Reserved for deployment during maneuvers at the range
240 GAZOMETR, Yakutia, 71300; 220-200-205
??? ARCHA., Kaluga reg., Tarus, 34080; Krug facility. Classified
270 BARCA, Cuba, Lourdes POBox 247, 54234;
??? SHATROVYY, Azerbayjan, Akstafa, ZVEZDA-controlled
??? TREZUBETZ, Moscow reg., Shchelkovo, 51428 The ZVEZDA center
??? ??? Petersburg reg., Pavlovsk, 86622 OSNAZ training untis
AVRORA (Аврора), Moscow, The УС ГРУ ГШ Center
OASIS, Kaluga, Echelon 2, KOMETA air defense-controlled

more of the related data de-tabulated, seems to indicate the current, pre-activation status of some of the above and other installations:

47 ОРПУ Irkutsk Оёк) в/ч 51870 - передан в "Звезду"
50-й ОРПУ (Тикси-1 Морская,) в/ч 14145 "Телега"
99-й ОРПУ (Якутск)
309-й ЦРПУ ОБКЗ (Климовск Школьная,50 в/г «Гривна») в/ч 34608 "Гудок" сф 51г (51-73гг в/ч 71513 )
789-й ОРПУ (Спасск-Рязанский Войкова,2 + п.Панино - полигон) в/ч 02565 "Ластик" сф 42г 811-й ОРПУ (Мурманск п.Кильдинстрой Разина,8) в/ч 34630
902-й ОРПУ (п.Беринговский) - передан в "Звезду"
-й ОРПУ (Дисдорф, ГДР) в/ч 33947 "Горка" - расформирован
-й ОРПУ в/ч 34635 "Грануляция"
-й ОРПУ (Гатчина п.Тайворово) в/ч 41480 -"Звезда"
-й ОРПУ (Одесса п.Верхний Дальник) в/ч 42028 "Приборка" - передан в СБУ Украины
-й ОРПУ (Торенс, Куба) в/ч 54234 "Тростник" - выведен в Гатчину, оперативно вх. в состав "Звезда"
-й ОРПУ "Охрана"
-й ОРПУ "Оазис"
-й ОРПУ (Воркута) "Джемпер"
-й ОРПУ (Ашхабад п.Геок-Тепе) - расформирован
-й ОРПУ (Алма-Ата п.Талгар) - передан КЗ
-й ОРПУ (ГДР) "Низина" -
-й ОРПУ (ГДР) "Марион" -
-й ОРПУ (Монголия) "Горизонт" - в состав "Звезда"
-й ОРПУ (Камрань, Вьетнам) "Восток" - принадлежал ВМФ,
-й ОРПУ (Рангун, Бирма) " " - "Звезда", расформирован
101-й уч.ОРТП ОсНаз (Павловск Обороны,1) в/ч 86622 расф 98г

***

and this bonus is the Russkies' record of having intercepted a radio transmissions from a B-52 returning from the Max 2007 airshow:
28.08.07., 6761 кГц ,
18:36 Tuff 01 -> Quid 82 "I'm looking contact with Quid 80"
18:40 Tuff 01 -> Quid 80 "Arsp. time 17:00z, altitude 280, frequency 264,125"
11175 кГц
18:50 Tuff 01 -> Croughton "Dep.: Moscow 13:30z, ETA: Barksdale 02:30z"

***
well, what do you say? I am not that impressed... because I am jaded. Putin asleep at the wheel? Would you like the bot to get his credit card numbers, or his Football briefcase combination? Does a Yankee White carry this for him? Inquiring minds want to know.

Casing out the Byelorussian secrets

The pictures of the Byelorussian KGB are here. Remember, this is the land where communism has never really died. You cans see the old embroidery-spangled flag of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic still unfurled over the City Hall/The Government Building in Minsk. These guys still think the USSR is alive and well.
By the way, note the antenna so typical of secret Soviet/Russian underground command centers.


And on Lenin Street there is a building having no number nor plaque, however festooned with an impressive suite of antennas.

This no ordinary TV antennas for the bored security guard's to watch the reruns of the stolid, tacky Communist song shows.

We were in the process of zeroing in on other features of the building, when a Byelorussian door lady scurried out onto the street and screamed at us in perfect Russian, "Movie cameras are forbidden!" We were using a tiny Canon digital gizmo with no hint of a camera.



and this is the KGB buidling. We were free to approach it and look it over from all directions, looking for any sign of good recce, but, apparently, the really interesting goodies are still inside, whereas only their classic defense-grade antennas and triangulators could be glimpsed on the turret.


Nobody ran out to arrest us. There was no sign of life, or even of a bureaucratic activity, or even of a faint scream of a political prisoner. It's just like scoping out the French Embassy in Moscow.

Next post is of the Russians in Cuba. It's a matter of organizing the photos. Sorry for the long delay.

Recce of French Embassy

The joke from a late-night show that seems to be appropriate for this post - "an ad on Ebay: French rifle, never fired, dropped once."

Most people don't think much about what the French are up to, but they are not behind the leading militaries of the world, and the same is true in the sense of their electronic warfare and intelligence.

Our man in Moscow (not the one that contributed here, nor here)- I know it sounds corny - has been lucky to gain a vantage point from where he succeeded to take a digital look at the French Embassy in Moscow. Don't ever underestimate the French.


You would have thought that this group is just a regular planar spike, but the upturned direction of the whips and the Rode & Shwarz HF dipole with an attenuator testify to its unexpected use.


this is a look from a yet different (I could only wonder) vantage point:

and these thistle whips - according to additional sources, whatever you may call these spikey finials, they have been known to radiate the most exotically encrypted traffic (some of which, unbuttoned, we will publish soon) you could pick up in this city. Note the magnetic antenna to the right of the R & S rig:



and here the gentlemen from France (remember Saturday Night Live's Coneheads? "We're from France!") have installed what might look like an average TV antenna, except - remember not to underestimate the French! - the rig and the microwave minisaucer further to the right are all aimed at the Russian Defense Ministry building.



beside being an average rooftop, they surely had to have the modest suite of satellite dishes.

and this standalone dish is accompanied by an interesting and shy Yagi-esque rig and a satcom disguised as a barstool:


as a collateral lesson from this recce exercise we have learned to appreciate the French taste for stylish rooftop radio shacks.

Next posts:
Centerfolds of KGB and other communication centers in Byelorussia, the land where communism never died
The candid shots of Russian listening outpost on Cuba, the site which has never ceased to operate.

Airport, Mooonscape and Diplograms

In this post:

PICTURESQUE RECCE EXERCISE
SLANT IMAGERY OF RUSSIA'S NOVA TERRA
DIPLOMATIC TELEGRAM ANALYSIS

We have been away, but not idle. We have met a bunch of interesting people, one of them is a former Tu-154 pilot who now flies for a discount airline. We call him Captain Alex, and he likes to take pictures in flight, from his pilot's seat. Here are some of the pictures that also serve us a breathtaking material for recce exercise.

Vnukovo Int'l Airport this winter.
The newly built, partially underground railroad spur serving the passenger terminal is visible to a knowledgeable analyst. The Russkies feel the bulge in the petrowallets, hence they feel that they can built some more megalomaniac projects to the airport.

Captain Alex took the picture and self-censored himself at that. The famous 06-24 runway is cut off below the photograph, because it serves the Government Terminal. Captain Alexey, however, was flying high and fast when he took the pictures below:



We can see the Government Terminal as the grey, black and brightly lit rectangular area towards the far (24) end of the 06-24 runway, below the T-juntion of the highways.

SLANT IMAGERY OF RUSSIA'S NOVA TERRA

Novaya Zemlya, that is. A high-level official who is actually in charge of declassifying DOD materials, has released the following imagery on condition that no other details would be divulged. The material has been declassified, but still has the stuck-in-limbo FOUO (for offficial use inly) markings.
Thus a special recognaissance platform that still remains classified is capable of obtaining imagery at extreme slant angles. That means the method is equivalent to a person shooting landscape phtographs from the ground level. Here is an image inside Severnyy, a Russian outpost on the lunar landscape ravaged by catastrophic nuclear explosions. The angles are marked on satellite map for visualizing the orientation of elements in the photograph.

What are these Russkies up to nowadays? What goof-ups can they suprise us with over there?


DIPLOMATIC TELEGRAM ANALYSIS

A certain someone sent in this telegram, fully confinced that it is a Russian code-word or other type of code text.

It is sufficient to have studied comparative analysis of Slavic languages to spot Bulgarian suffixed articles ( -te, -to) at the end of the nouns. As far as we know, no other Slavic country uses Latin X to represent the "sh" sound. Our contributor is an avid ham radio operator who claims this was a RTTY message sent in an easily decodable diplomatic format. Note the year. We have some really recent material, but are being very careful with what we release.

Good luck to us all, and happy new moon month.

Another Moscow radar site

Few people in the business know about the Chulkovo radar station. Another one of those non-descript dome-shack-and-a-mast site that has never been talked about or reported. However, this very installation is responsible for most of radar and communications monitoring, also for ensuring secure communications for Russia's government and military transmissions, including those originating from Moscow's airports, one of these located nearby the neighboring Bykovo. Google Maps here

This is another view, courtesy of Google Earth.

And this crowning touch is from our friendly and erudite photog, the very one that took the pictures of Butovo Radio Surveillance Site, after his plane took off from the aforementioned Bykovo airport.

The stolen Russian intelligence

Military and government professionals know how the importance of keeping classified information within secure environment. The transgression could cost someone his career, or the indelible, unforgettable wound on his consciousness that thousands hours of work and government's priceless  intelligence gathered through painstaking effort has  fallen into the hands of unsuspecting at best, uncleared civilian. The lesson learned by a Russian SIGINT professional is related below in its original, contributed by a radio amateur.

The SIGINT specialist had a keepsake tape made for him of the best moments from Russian radio surveillance of US Strategic Command and other sorties. On the way home, he could not stand the temptation to let an accidental fellow traveller listen to the tape and later on stealing the tape. The story is heartbreaking, to say the least.

Насчет пеленга я не знаю, какими антеннами они работали. На пеленгаторе сидело три срочника (обычно дембеля), так что им этот пеленг был до одного места. Обычно на рядовые самолеты (транспортники REACH, то есть С-130, С-5, С-7), заправщики и тому подобное пеленг был никому не нужен. И в таких случаях мое общение с пеленгаторами выглядело так:
Я сижу на посту, решаю от скуки взять транспортник на ГКСС. Слушаю, что он дает информацию, что примерно прибывает на Гейленкирхен через 2 часа, на борту 10 тонн груза, просит погоду. Даю команду на пеленг: "Работает 9011". Пеленгатор тут же спрашивает: "А что там за самолет то?". Я отвечаю, что транспортник. Он после этого тут же забивает на пеленг совершенно. После прослушивания я спрашиваю:"Ну что, пеленг давай". Меня просят сообщить, что же я там услышал. Я говорю, что он летит в Германию, прибывает через пару часиков. После этого пеленгатор отвечает:"Ну запиши там 230 градусов". Это так происходило чаще всего. Если самолет посерьезней, то они что то старались изобразить, и даже иногда получалось. Но каким образом они это делали и какие антенны использовали я к сожалению не знаю.
Что же касается позывных, то их основные типы были известны, то есть какой самолет под какими позывными летает. А вот предполагаемые частоты и позывной на отдельные случаи обычно почти всегда приходит по ориентировке. Что же касается содержания радиообмена, то не всегда (исключительно на собственном опыте) можно определить тип самолета, так как военные самолеты, выходящие на ИКАО ничего не говорят, а всего лишь дают три точки своих координат и уровень полета и все. И даже на ГКСС не всегда удается понять, что за самолет, так как на моей памяти бомберы, запрашивавшие канал связи со своей авиабазой обычно никакой информации туда не давали, просто говорили расчетное время прибытия и давали Operations normal, то есть, что полет проходит нормально. А подтверждение тому, что это бомбер я обычно получал, когда оператор сам их просил назвать тип самолета и они говорили его. На ИКАО я однажды по ориентировке ждал перегон тактики 07.06.97. С Европы на континент гнали стаю F-15. Называлось все это движение Coronet East 135. Работали они на частоте ИКАО с ЦУП Нью-Йорк на 13306. Постоянно выходили заправщики КС-135 под позывными BLUE 71,72,74,82,84. Давали координаты и высоту полета, ну как обычно, причем эшелон периодически опускался до 210-230 для дозаправки. Шли они по точкам 43n 43w, 44n, 45w, 44n, 50w. Потом у одного из заправщиком состоялся разговор с оператором Нью-Йорка, где пилот сообщил, что они Коронет Ист 135, причем проспеллировал название, и сообщил позывные тактики, то есть истребителей. Выглядело это так:" New York this is Blue 71. We are Coronet East 135. We have Mazda 31, Mazda 32, Mazda 33, Mazda 34, Mazda 35 and Mazda 36". Все это он еще раз проспеллировал и дал очередные координаты. То есть в принципе если бы не ориентировка, то я бы, не зная, что все это значит, даже и значения этому бы не придал. В основном конечно все заранее известно по ориентировкам, но для меня и был главный интерес, когда заранее зная какую то информацию, находишь самое явное ее подтверждение.
Насчет поста, то я не знаю, как же сделать так, чтобы меня все же взяли. У меня ведь из моей части остались подтверждения допуска и тому подобное. Но я думаю, что это покажет разговор с командиром части.
Самое интересное, что самые волнительные моменты, причем записанные при идеальной слышимости (ну это было качество почти как в студии, почти полное отсутствие шумов и ясные, четкие голоса), причем на кассете было все: бомберы, разведчики, АВАКС, причем не просто выходы на связь, а разные интересные моменты, так вот, такую кассету, выстраданную за полгода (ведь не всегда такая идеальная слышимость и разговоры необычные) я вез на память домой. И вот в поезде из Улан-Удэ с нами ехал дембель какой-то танкист, что ли. Мы ему дали на плейере послушать, он был отрясен, хоть и не знал английского, и вероятно попросту ее спи...дил, чтобы в своей родной деревне девкам давать слушать и рассказывать байки, каким он был отважным танкистом-радиоразведчиком. Он у меня еще в поезде спрашивал, нет ли еще такой кассеты, а то бы подарили ему. Я даже и подумать не мог, что она ему так в душу запала. До сих пор вспоминаю, сердце кровью обливается, в прямом смысле. Мы на дембель сравнивали, у кого самые интересные записи и по качеству слышимости. Так вот эта кассета лидировала тогда с огромным отрывом. С каким бы безмерным удовольствием я бы ее сейчас выложил вам, друзья!!!! Качество ее было просто студийным, поверьте на слово! Какая же сволочь этот танкист...

(source) You wish you could relearn Russian again.

Russian Radio Surveillance Center

One of our Moscow-touring friends who also happen to have an admirable college education and a sharp eye for all things hi-tech, secret and Russian, has stumbled on (surely one of many) Russian Federal radio surveillance center, for decades having been tucked next to Butovo, a quaint village next to Moscow. The giant city by now has swallowed up this village and given it a subway station, but the pictures disclose an intriguing side of the Russian heartland.

As one would expect from similar outpost anywhere in the world, the most exciting, government secrecy, hi-tech installations usually occupy a non-descript, humble, pastoral house just like this



Just when our friendly photographer had finished taking the pictures, he was approached by a serious looking but polite plain-clothes officer-type, and asked for ID. Speaking perfect Russian, but having a foreign passport, our photog seemed to have placed the officer into an uncomfortable predicament, which was resolved by our photog offering to erase the pictures from the Flash card. Herein lies a comment on the IQ of Russian well-dressed gentlemanly perimeter guards. He accepted the offer smilingly and bid our photog farewell, the images safe in the camera's memory.

And just to show that this is not your average ham radio club, feast your eyes on what must be a Western-import, most probably Thomson, interferometric tracking array, adapted to one of those numerous, Russkie-ingenuous radio spectrum snooping ideas. Birch trees look Pasternak-esque, don't they?


Could anyone name this if it was an abstract sculpture at the Burning Man festival?