my bot reports that Widnows XP Porofessional computers licensed to Russian Federation opneed critical US documents dirextly from the email boxes ( i.e. mail.xxxxx.zz) of these top directors of the facility:
ALFEROV, Alexander Pavlovich (Алферов Александр Павлович)
KISELEV, Boris Valentinovich (Киселев Борис Валентинович)
PYARIN, Victor Anatolevich (Пярин Виктор Анатольевич)
MITROFANOV, Sergey Vasilevich (Митрофанов Сергей Васильевич)
the computers are assigned or located at the FAPSI commnads:
В/ч 2580
В/ч 16660 one of the commands at the Russia's equivalent of US NSA - FAPSI, ФАПСИ, formerly ЦОПУПС, TsOPUPS, Central Separate Field Center for Government Communications (Центральный Отдельный Полевой Узел Правительственной Связи)
Showing posts with label bot. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bot. Show all posts
Monday, February 16, 2009
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
The same Russian in USA obtains a schedule of NATO plans
Our bot has found the following message from August 2007 - the Russian already has the schedule of upcoming NATO exercises:
The source is the same as in this post. Who could this guy be?
The source is the same as in this post. Who could this guy be?
Russian illegal in US reports on military traffic?
This is an unexpected harvest my bots brought in:
It shows that somebody very loyal to the Russian Federation, and not associated with the Russian Embassy in USA, has easily intercepted US-UK radio traffic. The first message deals with a mysterious emergency search and rescue by NATO in the Atlantic. The second message, stored on an unnamed server, this individual says that he left his recording equipment listening to the 6697 Hz frequency, Upper Side Band, RATT transmission mode. What he picked up is a Nimrod, a British maritime surveillance plane leaving US on the way to RAF Kinloss. The Russian listener appears to be professionally experienced in the US-NATO radio traffic patterns. The telegraphic style of the message is chillingly old school.
Do you see anything consistent with the material in this post?
It shows that somebody very loyal to the Russian Federation, and not associated with the Russian Embassy in USA, has easily intercepted US-UK radio traffic. The first message deals with a mysterious emergency search and rescue by NATO in the Atlantic. The second message, stored on an unnamed server, this individual says that he left his recording equipment listening to the 6697 Hz frequency, Upper Side Band, RATT transmission mode. What he picked up is a Nimrod, a British maritime surveillance plane leaving US on the way to RAF Kinloss. The Russian listener appears to be professionally experienced in the US-NATO radio traffic patterns. The telegraphic style of the message is chillingly old school.
Do you see anything consistent with the material in this post?
Monday, February 2, 2009
Agencies curious about this blog
All the while I am working my way through the new materials, I am getting a whole lot of not-so-friendly comments that I do not post for simple reason of not losing my Adsense account. As someone threatened in a previous post, I do need Adsense to buy a beer once in a while.
You might be aware that I am using bots to find and check info. Bots can query servers more efficiently than a human operator. I also use bots to find servers that tried to research this blog, either by Googling the author's ID, blog ID, and other Boolean operators, or back-end log entries.
But my bots are the ones that report what is going on behind my back. Here are the ISPs that originated unnatural curiosity about my blog:
Su29 Telecom Isp, Russian Federation: a lot of Russian military detachment inquiries
Wittenberg-net Germany diplomatic corps-related searches
kvkure.borda.ru -Russian air defense college, SIGINT and ELINT queries
host.194.telekom.ru - FSB internal departmental employee queries
gw1.gov.ee -Department Of Data Communications, (query: сотрудник отдела «П» ФСБ, Саша Дюков, штатный провокатор и сотрудник отдела «П» ФСБ Российской Федерации, имеющий имеющий оперативный псевдоним «Флаг»)
195.20.126.199, Headquarters Of National Armed Forces Republic Of Latvia - SIGINT inquiries
93.81.155.202 Investelektrosviaz Ltd, Russian military detachment inquiries
The situation gets ever more curious!
You might be aware that I am using bots to find and check info. Bots can query servers more efficiently than a human operator. I also use bots to find servers that tried to research this blog, either by Googling the author's ID, blog ID, and other Boolean operators, or back-end log entries.
But my bots are the ones that report what is going on behind my back. Here are the ISPs that originated unnatural curiosity about my blog:
Su29 Telecom Isp, Russian Federation: a lot of Russian military detachment inquiries
Wittenberg-net Germany diplomatic corps-related searches
kvkure.borda.ru -Russian air defense college, SIGINT and ELINT queries
host.194.telekom.ru - FSB internal departmental employee queries
gw1.gov.ee -Department Of Data Communications, (query: сотрудник отдела «П» ФСБ, Саша Дюков, штатный провокатор и сотрудник отдела «П» ФСБ Российской Федерации, имеющий имеющий оперативный псевдоним «Флаг»)
195.20.126.199, Headquarters Of National Armed Forces Republic Of Latvia - SIGINT inquiries
93.81.155.202 Investelektrosviaz Ltd, Russian military detachment inquiries
The situation gets ever more curious!
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
USSR's ghost units alive and well in cyberspace
The Database's bot has found data that can be formatted into this report.
The following military units have used their Sun or Linux machines to attempt and establish unauthorized access to US DOD, Defense contractor, and NATO servers:
40236 Leninsk, Baykonur, (Кзыл-Ординская обл. г.Ленинск, Байконур)
96742 Chita (Чита)
Rostov-on-Don Defense Institute of the Missile Forces (Ростовский Военный институт Ракетных войск / Ростов-на-Дону)
Ghost units still fiuntioning in cyberspace? Excellent deception, diversion, and maskirovka tactic.
two units: в/ч пп 36546 ОБС, and 15332 formerly located in Poland at Borne-Sulinovo (incredible: "Bourne"identity?) Борне-Сулиново
The following military units have used their Sun or Linux machines to attempt and establish unauthorized access to US DOD, Defense contractor, and NATO servers:
40236 Leninsk, Baykonur, (Кзыл-Ординская обл. г.Ленинск, Байконур)
96742 Chita (Чита)
Rostov-on-Don Defense Institute of the Missile Forces (Ростовский Военный институт Ракетных войск / Ростов-на-Дону)
Ghost units still fiuntioning in cyberspace? Excellent deception, diversion, and maskirovka tactic.
two units: в/ч пп 36546 ОБС, and 15332 formerly located in Poland at Borne-Sulinovo (incredible: "Bourne"identity?) Борне-Сулиново
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Russia breaks Swiss banks
I launched another bot on Friday morning, and a trifling matter of the day distracted me from following up on the bot's findings. I remembered it just now, on Sunday evening, and, instead of another harvest of secret information on Russia's communication and naval matters, the raw text returned contained the names of Alexey Kudrin, Sergey Ignatiev, Alexey Ulyukaev, Dmitri Pankin, Alexander Gorban and Nadezhda Ivanova (Алексей Кудрин, Сергей Игнатьев, Алексей Улюкаев, Дмитрий Панкин, Александр Горбань и Надежда Иванова).
The reason the bot found these names was that the text originated in a Russian Government's interoffice memo discussing the forthcoming visit of these Russian financial official to Washington, DC. The team , it seems, is to participate in the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. This all seems to be innocuously Russian, or even nouveau-Russian. Except there appears a sprinkling of neo-Russian words that my acquaintances from Moscow have identified as egotistically pompous proclamation of money withdrawals. Except the withdrawals were from such easily identifiable insittutions as UBS and Credit Suisse, and among the destination were Nekrasovian pseudonyms for Gazprom, and LUKoil(!!!???)
It comes as no suprise that the news now is percolating through the printed media, and, firstly, of course, through the blogosphere (as confirmed by Huffington Post) that the UBS and Credit Suisse and about to writedowns (or writeoffs) of loss, the first in five years, as a result of unprecedented market conditions. It appears that, concerted or not, Switzerland became too small for the Russian Bear's wallet, and might be assigned the status of a quaint and picturesque winter resort.
The reason the bot found these names was that the text originated in a Russian Government's interoffice memo discussing the forthcoming visit of these Russian financial official to Washington, DC. The team , it seems, is to participate in the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. This all seems to be innocuously Russian, or even nouveau-Russian. Except there appears a sprinkling of neo-Russian words that my acquaintances from Moscow have identified as egotistically pompous proclamation of money withdrawals. Except the withdrawals were from such easily identifiable insittutions as UBS and Credit Suisse, and among the destination were Nekrasovian pseudonyms for Gazprom, and LUKoil(!!!???)
It comes as no suprise that the news now is percolating through the printed media, and, firstly, of course, through the blogosphere (as confirmed by Huffington Post) that the UBS and Credit Suisse and about to writedowns (or writeoffs) of loss, the first in five years, as a result of unprecedented market conditions. It appears that, concerted or not, Switzerland became too small for the Russian Bear's wallet, and might be assigned the status of a quaint and picturesque winter resort.
Wednesday, April 9, 2008
Smoking Gun in the Russian Torpedo Intrigue
This letter might as well be the smoking gun that sets off all the alarms and sends out the message that Russian weapons are being traded on the grey market, to the highest bidder, which is Iran.The most unlikely continuation of the Russian torpedo affair (originating with the VA-111 Shkval) can be followed to the most unlikely but logical location: the landlocked country of Kyrgyzstan.
Performing cursory searches after the last post, I became distracted with the tangential thought: for sure, if I launched a bot with naval keywords like torpedo, Norman Polmar, Putin, Iran, previously compiled network locations, and search algorithms for file meta data, I would surely find something more interesting. Translating the keywords into Russian, I promptly sent the bot on its way and instantly received a list of results that included this scan and a DOC file.
Discussing the finds with knowledgeable sources, I can state that the torpedo affair takes place in the landlocked country of Kyrgyzstan, where the former USSR in its infinite wisdom based a torpedo design bureau in the country that has no navigable waters, which, also coincidentally, is responsible for design and construction of high-tech centrifuges (Iran double connection!). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the facility became a corporation ("Dastan OAO")
What is more or less clear after the in-depth analysis of the letter is that the letter writer, a whistle blower working as a software engineer describes intricacies of the torpedo software being the interest to other countries,and, due to the subcontractor politics, Kyrgyzstan's debts to the Russian Federation; and North Korea, India, and China being interested in the torpedo's control circuitry, some industrial espionage has been taking place in favor of an unexpected, high-bidder party, which is Iran.
The author of the letter seems to have alerted his country's military counterintelligence agency, which resulted in an answer (the image above) having an aloof, condescending, almost an informal, "thanks-but-no-thanks" tone. Business as usual. Back to work. Do not worry. Good man.
******
The letter to Kyrgyzstan's Military Counterintelligence Agency (use Google Translate applet in the upper right corner to translate the entire post into English):
Page 1
Я работал с октября 2006 года по октябрь 2007 года в Открытом Акционерном Обществе "ТНК "Дастан"(далее просто "Дастан") в должности инженера-программиста. "Дастан" - в советские времена назывался сначала "физприборы", затем "приборо- строительный_завод" и подчинялся минсудпрому. И в советские времена, и постсоветские времена, на "Дастане" делали в основном противолодочные торпеды, а также немного делали ширпотреб - медицинские центрифуги. Причем "Дастан" - монополист в области серийного производства противолодочных торпед(правда при советах на нем делали только системы наведения для торпед - Головные Отсеки). Сразу скажу, что за год работы на "Дастане" мне поручали делать софт реального времени(штатный) только для ширпотреба(для MCS-51), и я не имел служебного формального доступа к режимной(закрытой) информации. Но кое-что удалось тем не менее разузнать. Во второй половине 90-х, "Дастан" оказался монопольным владельцем конструкторско-технологической документации(КТД) на изделие "СЭТ-92M", название означает - Самонаводящаяся Электрическая Торпеда. Сразу отмечу, что в этой торпеде есть активный гидролокатор(входит в ГО, см. далее), а метод пеленгации цели - фазовый. Вышеуказанный комплект КТД на СЭТ-92M был продан "Дастаном" в КНР, а затем сами СЭТ-92M производились "Дастаном" и им же продавались в Индию. В торпеду СЭТ-92M устанавливали Головной Отсек(ГО) имевший идентификатор "Керамика" (такое название, видимо из-за широкого применения в нем пъезокерамических преобразователей: вибраторов-излучателей и вибраторов-приемников). "Керамика" была реализована на элементной базе, соответствующей ЭВМ третьего поколения - Интегральные_Микросхемы(ИМС) Средней_Интеграционной_Степени(СИС), то есть логика на 564(немного 533), а аналоговые куски - на 140. Такие операции, как: фильтрации(согласованные,несогласованные) , генерация , интегрирование, дифференцирование, компарирование, и т.д. делались на аналоговых схемах. Усиление делалось на транзисторных схемах. Бортовой контроллер не имел программного(микропрограммного) управления. По частично достоверной информации, "Керамика" была содрана с соответствующего Головного Отсека американской торпеды Мк43(или Мк44), то есть советы("Гидроприбор") попросту подобрали подходящую советскую элементную базу(на конец 80-х). К началу нового тысячелетия, ГО "Керамика" окончательно морально устарела. Менеджмент "Дастана" решил заполучить современную ГО, в которой и обработка гидроакустических сигналов, и все управление торпедой было бы реализовано на однокристальной микро-ЭВМ типа "TMSxxxx"(для тех кто не знает - это микропроцессоры класса "DSP"-digital_signal_proccessing). Но на "Дастане" не было специалистов в области создания софта реального времени для задач цифровой обработки гидроакустических сигналов(да что там задачи ЦОС, на "Дастана" не было даже специалиста для создания софта реального времени для систем автостабилизации - САУ центрифугой). Поэтому менеджмент "Дастана" заключил полулегальный контракт с секретной фирмой "НПП "Редан"(расположена то ли в Москве, то ли в ближнем Подмосковье) на создание вышеуказанного программного продукта.
Page 2
Исполнители от "НПП "Редан" поставили условие - штатный софт в файловом виде, созданный ими, НЕ будет ПОЛНОСТЬЮ передан на "Дастан", а всего лишь "Дастан" получает ПОЛНЫЙ штатный софт ТОЛЬКО в виде законченной прошивки памяти чипа ОКМЭВМ(в качестве ОКМЭВМ была выбрана ADSP2191 from Analog Devices corp., ОКМЭВМ - однокристальная микро ЭВМ). Причем, редановцы добились программно-аппаратными методами необходимого уровня защиты прошивки от неснкционированного ее считывания. Также, редановцы заявили(разумеется приватно), что потенциальным покупателям новой торпеды - китайцам,индийцам,вьетнамцам и т.д. абсолютно неинтересно "железо" торпеды, им не стоит труда быстро организовать массовое производство торпед конструкцию которой они могут попросту содрать. Покупателям пока проблематично создать необходимый прикладной софт, как тот, что могут гарантированно делать редановцы.
В настоящий момент, Кыргызстан имеет значительный госдолг перед РФ. В настоящий момент, блокирующий пакет акций "Дастана" принадлежит Кыргыстану-государ- ству. В течении как минимум 10 последних лет, РФ не отказалась бы от получения "Дастана" в свою собственность(до сих пор в РФ нет подобного предприятия), а в последнии два-три года эти просьбы-требования стали весьма настоятельными... В разработку ГО нового поколения(ее идентификатор - "Керамика Модернизированная"), "Дастан" вложил более миллиона $ US . Page 3
"Керамика Модернизированная", как и ее предшественница, осуществляет поиск цели, а затем наведение на цель активным методом: активного типа гидролокатор ПОСТОЯННО испускает зондирующие посылки, и ПОСТОЯННО(разумеется здесь под этим термином подразумевается в режиме разделения времени, как и у всякого импульсного радара) принимает отраженные гидроакустические сигналы, и ПОСТОЯННО производит ОБРАБОТКУ и АНАЛИЗ принятого сигнала для "выуживания" из него полезной(необходимой) инфы(спектральные функции и сигнатуры, временные функции и сигнатуры, пространственно-фазовые функции и сигнатуры). Это ОДНОЗНАЧНО дает принципиальную возможность ДИСТАНЦИОННОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ торпедой. ДИСТАНЦИОННОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ торпедой, разумеется возможно лишь при соответствующей реализации. Можно предложить такой вариант реализации. ГО излучает периодически ТОН-сигнал(проманипулированная гармоника), и соответственно получает отраженный от цели ТОН-сигнал(кроме отражения от цели есть масса других, но помеховых отражений - реверберации, интерференций ревербераций, рефракции, дифрации, которые отфильтровываются в ГО в той или иной степени, и не изменяют сути проблемы) , если использовать манипулирующую функцию(а это дискретная ф-я) в качестве кода некой команды, то можно заложить в бортовой контроллер(в его память) некоторое множество "черных" команд, и при наличии в принятом сигнале манипулирующей функции соответ- ствующей такой команде, эта команда(из "черного" списка) будет исполняться. "Черный" список может включать например такую команду, как команда типа "меня_не_видно", или команда типа "пройти_в_стороне_от_меня" и т.д. Таким образом, чтобы пользователь торпеды был уверен в предсказуемости пове- дения торпеды, он должен проанализировать(проэмулировать) ПОЛНОСТЬЮ весь штатный софт на всем наборе входных параметров(аргументов) всех программ(подпрограмм, процедур, модулей и т.д.). В противном случае, он будет применять торпеду с "сюрпризом". Буду признателен за ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ и КОМПЕТЕНТНОЕ мнение об ошибочности/верности моих рассуждений и выводов по проблеме "сюрприза". Итак, ПРОБЛЕМА_№1 - принципиально возможен ли "сюрприз" ? Далее. Предположим, что потенциальный индийский покупатель осведомлен о принципиальной возможности "сюрпризов" в предлагаемой ему торпеде. Согласится ли он тогда покупать такую "шкатулку с сюрпризом" ? Поэтому, ПРОБЛЕМА_№2 - согласится ли некто купить серъезную партию таких торпед с "сюрпризом"(разумеется, раз употреблено слово "сюрприз", то это означает, что по крайней мере часть кодов штатного софта недоступна для покупателя). И наконец, ПРОБЛЕМА_№3 - можно ли считать, что какая-то часть менеджмента "Дастана" (или все они) являются агентами Российских спецслужб, или они всего лишь лохи(абсолютно некомпетентные в проблемах современных систем вооружений) ? Буду признателен за ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ и КОМПЕТЕНТНОЕ мнение об ошибочности/верности моих рассуждений и выводов по проблемам №1,№2,№3
I have omitted the whistleblower's computer ID and its network IP information.
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Russian list of US codewords, Putin's letter
In this post, new stuff that the bot fetched:
I forgot about the adding to the post on the Russian Sigint station on Cuba, and sent out a bot with keywords in Russian (the list that was prepared by a good friend that speaks excellent Voronezh Russian (plus Chinese, Spanish, Tagalog, Persian, Arabic, Japanese, Hebrew [always a shadow of Mossad, isn't there?], German and Norwegian, has American citizenship, was born in a Moslem country and has a perfect Nordic look - all of which make his adventures fun and a great learning experience.
Thereupon I have opened the bot GUI, copy-pasted into the string window about 50(sic!) keywords in Russian, which equivalent to CODEWORD, SIGNATURE, PUTIN, IRAN, AGREEMENT, SECRET, GOLD, DOLLAR, RUBLE, USA, USN, etc (военно-морские силы, код, подпись, связь, валюта, соглашение, секретные)
The bot was out in the wild no more than 600 milliseconds after the 1.2 second it took to reach main(?) servers, when it returned (faster than previously, in the instances of the FSB Directory, or the first results) a harvest that included several raw TXT files, two of which contained live, classified content. First file name was IRANTRANS.DOC which, at the time, I had no patience to unbutton. I have copied unto here the only paragraph containing legible Russian material:
the link (http://scucin-avia.narod.ru/liotchiki/albom_kirichekvlad/albom_kirichekvladfiles/postrojenije-tech.jpg)
characters in purple are of questionable interest ("Marantz" could be intriguing, though: a modified CD recorder?)
пл.Восстания Vosstania Sq., a St. Peterssburg subway station 1
Васильеостровская Vasilieostrovskaya, a St. Petersburg subway station 2
КДПО a KGB/FSB uniut associated with border patrol
Петрополь according to my source - a bar near station 2 frequented by the SpB University's foreign language and middle east studies students
Дрезден Dresden - Putin's foreign service assignment?
КЗакПО,Ленинакан,18П.З a border guard outpost in Armenia
ГУК undetermined acronym
комитетчиком десятого...восьмого "KGB (associate from the) 10th...8th (directorate)"
10th directorate is uncertain, thought the 8th was the crypto and communications department
МГИМО the prominent Moscow State Foreign Relations Insitute
ТЭЧ a Technical Management Unit
Истихбарат Istihbarat, the Libyan Security Agency
ОАПО ПЗКПП ...o.СРЕДНИЙ a border outpost near Srednyy (no time to look up)
СпНГРУ a GRU diplomatic/intelligence/DATT unit
Дальне-Восточный,округ 55 отряд 7 п.з a border guard unit ID in the Russian Far East
105-й a KGB, then FSB or GRU unit associated with DATT service
What is this file? What kind of text is this? A garbled crypto, innocently de-garbled by the bot? Someone said that it is a garbled Cyrillic embedded into Polish. You can only guess. I will have more definite analysis of this material in later posts.
Russian-compiled list of US codewords
The second source's file name is FLOTKODOVO.doc, and it contains many of the codwords in ordiginal English.
After consulting with a friend who is in USN Reserves, I realized that the list is that of US Naval and Coast Guard codewords used by a US Joint Task Force (Four?) in the Caribbean-Atlantic. The Russians, or Russkies, as I like calling them critters on this blog, no offense intended ( it is my Southern charm background shinin' through), must have done a good homework of radio monitoring and put together this rather interesting compilation. Due to translation and formatting, it is non-alphabetical.
The Russian understanding of the meaning was very much off, for example, they could not know that BILLY BUD meant a situation where sexual crime was committed aboard a searchable vessel. A Russian listener associated it almost literally to a billy club ("битой" - with a baseball bat ?!) I s that how they opearate: when in doubt -fudge it?
Many of these were easy for the Russian to know/figure out/ distill out of Google, but there are things like BILLY BUD, where I provide the Russian interpretation and the real meaning used by the US:
RESISTOR сопротивление, resistance - no clue, actually: a non-cooperative boater
CAPACITOR конденсатор, capacitor - really: a vessel with a probable cause for search
DIODE диод, diode - really: Dead in Water, drifting vessel, no way on
COIL катушка, coild, really: suspicious
TRANSISTOR -really: passenger vessel
POWER SUPPLY - no clue, really a vessel with contraband
9-SHOT - неизвестный p. (unknown meaning, no clue) really:port turn
MONITOR неизвестный p. really US Coast Guard
OREO Russians have no clue, but it is P3 Orion
I/O no clue, but it is: INS matter
FUSE no clue, US Customs
BUMP "push", no clue, really: hail someone by a click of an non-secure radio
UTL no clue, but: unable to locate
LL no clue, land line
CAR-LEFT , no clue, - left sideband of CB, non-obvious way of communicating
SOS no clue, but, US Secreatry of State
NCIC "Mational Crime Computer System" almost right: National Crime Information Center
PCW Russian got it right, but it means more: a violation of Pemit to Carry Concealed weapons
PSTIM no clue, possession of stimulants
PDOWN no clue, possession of donwers,
UILT no clue, under influence of liquor or THC
SCARAB Russian:"designer boat", really an innocent boat running scared
CIGARETTE Russian: "designer boat", really a guilty, arrestable boat running away
POPEYE, no clue, but it is am exerienced/retired sailor/boater
BUG no clue, it is an illegal immigrant/stowaway/INS problem
RAM no clue, cargo hold
ROM no clue, radio shack, radio report
C-NOTE Russians: $100, really: 100 gallons. tons
K - Russians: 1000, almost right - 1000 tons, gallons
ANALOG -no clue, really a bulk carrier
DIGITAL - no clue, really a container ship
CYCLE - no clue, really a round trip
HIGHWAY -no clue, really a plotted course
ZIGZAG - Russians: zigzagging course. Almost there: suspicious, avoidance course
BLUE - no clue, US Coast Guard
BLACK no clue, USN
8-BALL - Russians: captured, confiscated. Not exactly: a shootable target
BEERFRAME - no clue, really a confiscation and arrests
PHONE - no clue, really a backtalking subject
CAPTOR - Russians" captive torpedo; really an ex-captain, -military, smart attitude
CAPITAL - no clue, really a captain's personal cash
XPIG -Russians, a very creative guess: an ex-policeman; really a ship's piggy bank
FLOYD no clue, Florida
GEORGE - no clue, really Georgia
SCOTT -no clue, SC
NICK -no clue, really NC
VIRGIL - no clue, really VA
DALE - no clue, really DE
MARLIN - no clue, really MD
FIL - no clue, really PA
NUGENT - no clue (funny!) really NJ
ROSIE - no clue, really: Roosevelt Roads
KAY -no clue, really Key West
MAY -Russians: Mayport Naval Base; really: Miami
MOVIE - no clue, really Hollywood, FL
ESTEE no clue, really Ft. Lauderdale (think cosmetics)
WINNIEPEG - no clue (?) West Palm Beach
CHAPPA-Q no clue (and no chance -editor) Palm Beach (think Kennedy)
VR no clue, Vero Beach
CAPE COD - Russians went for the obvious, but is is Cape Canaveral (think Kennedy)
INDY - no clue - Daytona
MAYNOT - no clue, though it is Jacksonville Mayport NAS
COKE -no clue, really: Pensacola
TSAR - no clue, though they could try: CZAR is St. Petersburg FL
GITMO -Russians git right, it's a no brainer, Guantanamo
AT&T -no clue, it is US BATF
MOUSE - no clue, it stands for a radar report
MODEM -no clue: a secure comm channel
ROTA -US NAS Rota, Spain
PHIBRON -Russians got it right: USN amphibious Squadron
DATT -Russians correct: defense attache system
SIG -Russians went literal: "signal", whereas it is USN NAS Sigonella
AISSO - Russians Googled it: Automated Informations Systems Security officer
WIZZO -no clue: weapons systems officer
TACO - no clue, though they listened to S-3, P-3 talk- it is a tactical air combat coordinator
You never know what these bots would turn up next.
- Bits and pieces of a Russain classified letter
- Russian-compiled list of US codewords, for evryone's entertainment
I forgot about the adding to the post on the Russian Sigint station on Cuba, and sent out a bot with keywords in Russian (the list that was prepared by a good friend that speaks excellent Voronezh Russian (plus Chinese, Spanish, Tagalog, Persian, Arabic, Japanese, Hebrew [always a shadow of Mossad, isn't there?], German and Norwegian, has American citizenship, was born in a Moslem country and has a perfect Nordic look - all of which make his adventures fun and a great learning experience.
Thereupon I have opened the bot GUI, copy-pasted into the string window about 50(sic!) keywords in Russian, which equivalent to CODEWORD, SIGNATURE, PUTIN, IRAN, AGREEMENT, SECRET, GOLD, DOLLAR, RUBLE, USA, USN, etc (военно-морские силы, код, подпись, связь, валюта, соглашение, секретные)
The bot was out in the wild no more than 600 milliseconds after the 1.2 second it took to reach main(?) servers, when it returned (faster than previously, in the instances of the FSB Directory, or the first results) a harvest that included several raw TXT files, two of which contained live, classified content. First file name was IRANTRANS.DOC which, at the time, I had no patience to unbutton. I have copied unto here the only paragraph containing legible Russian material:
доКŃ�Ń�виŃ�оНŃ�и¶я~ ЃуК‚УщКСЕ Đ˝Đž, Ń�огОднŃ�пл.ВосстанияŃ�Мо ПОМнО Ń�ĐşВасильеостровская аСаўчЄ Ч КДПО ?1іы юЁ:Ń�Ń�, ГУФ Ń�Ń�Đž CD-Ń�окОŃ�ПетропольĐ´ĐľŃ� Он и в Đ�Ń�Ń�икоЮЫ‡ЩyзљЭIФ¤o-w C&'D-Ń�ДрезденокОхекаŃ�Đ´ĐľŃ�, Đ°КЗакПО,Ленинакан,18П.З ]3Đ´Đž Ń�Ń�ОвнŃ� High End Они пОка Đ˝ĐГУКľ дОйŃ�аНиŃ�Ń�. Đ� Ń�Đ°Đş, Marantz DR700 ПОМоŃ� ĐžŃ�комитетчиком десятогоŃ�Ńвосьмого�ĐľŃ�Ń�ĐМГИМО˛ĐťŃ�Ń�Ń� СапиŃ�Ń� Ń� Đ°ĐТЭЧ˝Đ°ĐťĐžĐłĐžĐ˛ИстихбаратОгО иНĐ�иŃ�Ń�ОвОгО вŃ�Ода (ОпŃОАПО ПЗКПП ĐşĐo.СРЕДНИЙ�иŃ�ĐľŃ�СпНГРУ žĐłĐž иНĐДальне-Восточный,округ 55 отряд 7 п.з кОаĐhtw-=2ş;038Ń�Đ¸ШЏщ†ы wг)Đ°ĐťŃ�нОгО)105-й на Ń�поŃ�иаНŃ�Đ˝Ń�Đľ ľŃ�Đş"ĐźŃ�СŃ�каНŃ�Đ˝Ń
the text also contained the only link next to a military unit designation ("ТЭЧ 979 иап") that pointed to this photo:
the text also contained the only link next to a military unit designation ("ТЭЧ 979 иап") that pointed to this photo:
the link (http://scucin-avia.narod.ru/liotchiki/albom_kirichekvlad/albom_kirichekvladfiles/postrojenije-tech.jpg)characters in purple are of questionable interest ("Marantz" could be intriguing, though: a modified CD recorder?)
пл.Восстания Vosstania Sq., a St. Peterssburg subway station 1
Васильеостровская Vasilieostrovskaya, a St. Petersburg subway station 2
КДПО a KGB/FSB uniut associated with border patrol
Петрополь according to my source - a bar near station 2 frequented by the SpB University's foreign language and middle east studies students
Дрезден Dresden - Putin's foreign service assignment?
КЗакПО,Ленинакан,18П.З a border guard outpost in Armenia
ГУК undetermined acronym
комитетчиком десятого...восьмого "KGB (associate from the) 10th...8th (directorate)"
10th directorate is uncertain, thought the 8th was the crypto and communications department
МГИМО the prominent Moscow State Foreign Relations Insitute
ТЭЧ a Technical Management Unit
Истихбарат Istihbarat, the Libyan Security Agency
ОАПО ПЗКПП ...o.СРЕДНИЙ a border outpost near Srednyy (no time to look up)
СпНГРУ a GRU diplomatic/intelligence/DATT unit
Дальне-Восточный,округ 55 отряд 7 п.з a border guard unit ID in the Russian Far East
105-й a KGB, then FSB or GRU unit associated with DATT service
What is this file? What kind of text is this? A garbled crypto, innocently de-garbled by the bot? Someone said that it is a garbled Cyrillic embedded into Polish. You can only guess. I will have more definite analysis of this material in later posts.
Russian-compiled list of US codewords
The second source's file name is FLOTKODOVO.doc, and it contains many of the codwords in ordiginal English.
After consulting with a friend who is in USN Reserves, I realized that the list is that of US Naval and Coast Guard codewords used by a US Joint Task Force (Four?) in the Caribbean-Atlantic. The Russians, or Russkies, as I like calling them critters on this blog, no offense intended ( it is my Southern charm background shinin' through), must have done a good homework of radio monitoring and put together this rather interesting compilation. Due to translation and formatting, it is non-alphabetical.
The Russian understanding of the meaning was very much off, for example, they could not know that BILLY BUD meant a situation where sexual crime was committed aboard a searchable vessel. A Russian listener associated it almost literally to a billy club ("битой" - with a baseball bat ?!) I s that how they opearate: when in doubt -fudge it?
Many of these were easy for the Russian to know/figure out/ distill out of Google, but there are things like BILLY BUD, where I provide the Russian interpretation and the real meaning used by the US:
RESISTOR сопротивление, resistance - no clue, actually: a non-cooperative boater
CAPACITOR конденсатор, capacitor - really: a vessel with a probable cause for search
DIODE диод, diode - really: Dead in Water, drifting vessel, no way on
COIL катушка, coild, really: suspicious
TRANSISTOR -really: passenger vessel
POWER SUPPLY - no clue, really a vessel with contraband
9-SHOT - неизвестный p. (unknown meaning, no clue) really:port turn
MONITOR неизвестный p. really US Coast Guard
OREO Russians have no clue, but it is P3 Orion
I/O no clue, but it is: INS matter
FUSE no clue, US Customs
BUMP "push", no clue, really: hail someone by a click of an non-secure radio
UTL no clue, but: unable to locate
LL no clue, land line
CAR-LEFT , no clue, - left sideband of CB, non-obvious way of communicating
SOS no clue, but, US Secreatry of State
NCIC "Mational Crime Computer System" almost right: National Crime Information Center
PCW Russian got it right, but it means more: a violation of Pemit to Carry Concealed weapons
PSTIM no clue, possession of stimulants
PDOWN no clue, possession of donwers,
UILT no clue, under influence of liquor or THC
SCARAB Russian:"designer boat", really an innocent boat running scared
CIGARETTE Russian: "designer boat", really a guilty, arrestable boat running away
POPEYE, no clue, but it is am exerienced/retired sailor/boater
BUG no clue, it is an illegal immigrant/stowaway/INS problem
RAM no clue, cargo hold
ROM no clue, radio shack, radio report
C-NOTE Russians: $100, really: 100 gallons. tons
K - Russians: 1000, almost right - 1000 tons, gallons
ANALOG -no clue, really a bulk carrier
DIGITAL - no clue, really a container ship
CYCLE - no clue, really a round trip
HIGHWAY -no clue, really a plotted course
ZIGZAG - Russians: zigzagging course. Almost there: suspicious, avoidance course
BLUE - no clue, US Coast Guard
BLACK no clue, USN
8-BALL - Russians: captured, confiscated. Not exactly: a shootable target
BEERFRAME - no clue, really a confiscation and arrests
PHONE - no clue, really a backtalking subject
CAPTOR - Russians" captive torpedo; really an ex-captain, -military, smart attitude
CAPITAL - no clue, really a captain's personal cash
XPIG -Russians, a very creative guess: an ex-policeman; really a ship's piggy bank
FLOYD no clue, Florida
GEORGE - no clue, really Georgia
SCOTT -no clue, SC
NICK -no clue, really NC
VIRGIL - no clue, really VA
DALE - no clue, really DE
MARLIN - no clue, really MD
FIL - no clue, really PA
NUGENT - no clue (funny!) really NJ
ROSIE - no clue, really: Roosevelt Roads
KAY -no clue, really Key West
MAY -Russians: Mayport Naval Base; really: Miami
MOVIE - no clue, really Hollywood, FL
ESTEE no clue, really Ft. Lauderdale (think cosmetics)
WINNIEPEG - no clue (?) West Palm Beach
CHAPPA-Q no clue (and no chance -editor) Palm Beach (think Kennedy)
VR no clue, Vero Beach
CAPE COD - Russians went for the obvious, but is is Cape Canaveral (think Kennedy)
INDY - no clue - Daytona
MAYNOT - no clue, though it is Jacksonville Mayport NAS
COKE -no clue, really: Pensacola
TSAR - no clue, though they could try: CZAR is St. Petersburg FL
GITMO -Russians git right, it's a no brainer, Guantanamo
AT&T -no clue, it is US BATF
MOUSE - no clue, it stands for a radar report
MODEM -no clue: a secure comm channel
ROTA -US NAS Rota, Spain
PHIBRON -Russians got it right: USN amphibious Squadron
DATT -Russians correct: defense attache system
SIG -Russians went literal: "signal", whereas it is USN NAS Sigonella
AISSO - Russians Googled it: Automated Informations Systems Security officer
WIZZO -no clue: weapons systems officer
TACO - no clue, though they listened to S-3, P-3 talk- it is a tactical air combat coordinator
You never know what these bots would turn up next.
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